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Abstract: This paper analyses the rise of the Far Right in Western Europe 
and the widespread political, social and scholarly concern due to the extremist par-
ties’ recent electoral performances. It holds that, already since the late 1980s, we 
are witnessing a new (third) “wave” of right-wing extremism in several European 
countries —with some of these parties having already undergone electoral and po-
litical consolidation— and joins other contributions that approach the issue of their 
“mainstreaming” process. It presents some data on the Far Right’s electoral and po-
litical evolution, which seem to confirm that some mainstreaming did take place in 
the decades between the 1980s and the 2000s. However, more recently the immi-
gration issue and the “refugees’ crisis” seem to have prompted the radicalisation of 
many (if not all) of these parties, and even of some parties which were not thought 
to be extremist. The paper reflects on this process of alleged radicalisation of the 
Far Right. The conclusion speculates on its future evolution and highlights future 
avenues for research.
Keywords: Far Right, mainstreaming process, migration, radicalisation.
Resumen: Este artículo analiza el auge de la ultraderecha en Europa occi-
dental y la creciente preocupación política, social y académica ante los recientes 
resultados electorales de partidos políticos extremistas. Desde finales de los años 
ochenta asistimos a una nueva (tercera) “ola” de radicalismo de la ultra dere-
cha en diversos países europeos, con algunos de estos partidos habiéndose con-
solidado electoral y políticamente; el artículo sigue así la estela de otros análi-
* Recibido el 23 de febrero de 2018 y aceptado el 8 de mayo de 2018.
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sis que han abordado la cuestión de si éstos se han vuelto “mainstream” o menos 
radicales. El artículo incluye algunos datos de la evolución política y electoral 
de la ultraderecha que parecen confirmar que ese proceso de “mainstreaming” 
tuvo lugar entre la década de los ochenta y los dos mil. Sin embargo, la cuestión 
de la inmigración, relacionada con la llamada “crisis de los refugiados” , parece 
haber acelerado la radicalización de muchos (cuando no todos) los partidos de 
ultraderecha, así como algunos partidos que no eran considerados extremistas. 
El artículo aborda ese proceso de supuesta radicalización de la ultraderecha. La 
conclusión especula sobre su futura evolución y plantea posibles vías para la in-
vestigación ulterior del fenómeno.
Palabras clave: ultraderecha, proceso de normalización, migración, radicali-
zación.
I. Introduction
With the exception of Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Luxemburg, 
where no right-wing extremist party has made its entrance into the Na-
tional Parliament, the Far Right seems to have been extremely success-
ful in Western Europe lately1.2Their impressive electoral performance 
has raised widespread political, social and scholarly concern; it comes 
as no surprise that the family of right-wing extremist parties has be-
come the most intensely studied in the last decades in political science2. 
1 Some right-wing extremist parties have also reached striking electoral results in sev-
eral Eastern European countries like Hungary, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria and Latvia. Al-
though some scholars claim to consider (and study) them as members of the family of the 
Far Right (see for example Cas Mudde, The Study of Populist Radical Right Parties: To-
wards a Fourth Wave (Oslo: Center for Research on Extremism, The Extreme Right, Hate 
Crime and Political Violence, University of Oslo. C-Rex Working Paper Series, 2016)), 
others have emphasized the distinctiveness of the cleavage structures of Western and East-
ern European countries (Simon Bornschier. Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right. The 
New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010)). 
Differences with regard to the impact of the crisis on the stability of the party systems in 
the West and in the East (Enrique Hernandez and Hanspeter Kriesi, “The Electoral Con-
sequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe”. European Journal of Politi-
cal Research 55-2 (2016)) and with regard to the profiles of right-wing extremist voters 
(Trevor J. Allen, “All in the party family? Comparing far right voters in Western and Post-
Communist Europe”. Party Politics 23-3 (2017)) have also been noted: Westerners are 
more hostile to immigration, less religious, and economically less left-wing than extremist 
voters from the Eastern part of Europe. Following this logic and the principles of the analy-
sis based on a meaningful comparison, I will concentrate on the EU-15 countries plus Swit-
zerland and Norway, both of which have joined the Schengen area and are members of the 
EFTA. 
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Already in the late 1980s, the academic literature started to analyse the 
extremist upsurge, signalling the beginning of a new (third) “wave” of 
right-wing extremism in several European countries3. Only two decades 
later, some extremist parties had already undergone electoral and po-
litical consolidation, and several contributions started approaching the 
issue of their “mainstreaming” process4. More recently, however, we 
might be witnessing a different phase in the Far Right’s political evo-
lution, since the immigration issue—the Far Right’s topic par excel-
lence—is again at the forefront of the political debate in Europe; the 
“refugee crisis” has prompted the radicalization of many (if not all) the 
Far Right parties (and even of some parties which were not thought to 
be extremist). This article reflects on this process of alleged radicaliza-
tion of the Far Right. It first presents some data on its electoral and po-
litical evolution, which seem to confirm that some mainstreaming did 
actually take place in the decades between the 1980s and the 2000s. The 
following section aims at showing some evidence of the reverse pro-
cess: the radicalization of the Far Right’s discourse. The conclusion 
speculates on the future evolution of the Far Right and highlights future 
avenues for research.
2 Mudde, The Study of Populist Radical Right Parties: Towards a Fourth Wave, 2016.
3 Klaus Von Beyme, “Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe”. West European Pol-
itics 11-2 (1988).
According to several experts, the first wave took place after the Second World War 
(Piero Ignazi, “The Silent Counter Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of the Ex-
treme Right-Wing Parties in Europe”. European Journal of Political Research 22 (1992); 
Von Beyme, “Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe”, 1988; Ekkart Zimmermann and 
Thomas Saalfeld, “The Three Waves of Right-Wing Extremism”. In Encounters with the 
Contemporary Radical Right, edited by Peter Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (Boulder: West-
view Press, 1993)), whereas the second one entailed the rise of new phenomena like pou-
jadism in France and the survival of the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano, which served 
as a reference for all other extremists until the breakthrough of the French National Front in 
the eighties. In his 2016 work, Mudde suggests a new (fourth) wave of scholarship may be 
gaining ground.
4 Paul Hainsworth (ed.), The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the 
Mainstream. (London-New York: Pinter, 2000).
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II. The electoral evolution of the Far Right: no longer marginal?
The rise of the new Far Right parties5 has resulted in an expanded 
field of study which has eagerly devoted itself to the study of the varia-
bles accounting for this phenomenon. The reason for this concern is clear: 
in recent decades, some of these parties have managed to obtain impres-
sive electoral results (both in terms of votes and seats), as the table below 
shows. Which parties are they? Can they be regarded as similar? Further-
more, what makes them belong to the same family? The definition of the 
Far Right family is a rather controversial issue in the contemporary litera-
ture. For the sake of brevity, I have included here the “usual suspects”6, the 
best known—and currently most electorally successful—parties in each 
country, which are rather unanimously considered as members of this new 
party family, namely: the Front National in France; the Dansk Folkeparti 
(Danish People’s Party) in Denmark; Perussuomalaiset (The Finns, for-
merly the True Finns) in Finland; Sverigedemokraterna (the Sweden Dem-
ocrats); the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet or Progress Party; the Austrian 
Freiheitlicher Partei Österreichs (FPÖ, Freedom Party); the Schweizer-
ische Volkspartei (Swiss Popular Party); the Italian Lega Nord; the Vlaams 
Belang in Belgium (Flanders), formerly Vlaams Block (Flemish Interest-
Flemish Bloque); the Partij Voor der Vrijheid (Party of Freedom) in the 
Netherlands; the Greek Chrysí Avgí or Golden Dawn; and the last ones to 
become established in the extremist landscape: the British United Kingdom 
5 The issue of how to name these parties is rather controversial in the academic litera-
ture. Two decades ago, a reputed scholar even talked of the “war of words” defining the ex-
treme right party family (Cas Mudde, “The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party 
Family”. West European Politics, 19-2 (1996)) and found more than 25 different approaches 
to it (see also Peter Mair and Cas Mudde, “The Party Family and its Study”. Annual Review 
of Political Science, 1 (1998)). Even nowadays, various different terms are still used (and 
contested): Far Right, right-wing extremist, radical right, right-wing populist, xenophobic, 
anti-immigrant … among many others. Each one emphasizes different aspects of the phe-
nomenon: whereas “radical right” and “right-wing extremist” focus on the ideological side, 
labels which incorporate some variants of the term “populism” approach it from the perspec-
tive of the style or attitude these parties use (although more voices are increasingly being 
heard in favour of considering populism an ideology in itself). The debate has not yet come to 
an end, for it entails contrasting views on the kind of menace these parties represent for dem-
ocratic systems (if any at all) and, eventually, what is to be understood under “democracy”: 
Mudde (Cas Mudde, “Three decades of populist radical right in Western Europe: So what?”. 
European Journal of Political Research 52 (2013)), for instance, holds that radicalism ac-
cepts procedural (liberal) democracy, whereas extremism does not, hence opting for the label 
“populist radical right”. Given the space limitations, I will use the term “Far Right” (which 
includes both radical and extremist parties) as the most inclusive of all, although I may, for 
stylistic reasons, change to “extreme right” sometimes.
6 Mudde, The Study of Populist Radical Right Parties: Towards a Fourth Wave, 2016.
The Far Right in Western Europe Beatriz Acha Ugarte
Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto 
ISSN: 1130-8354 • ISSN-e: 2445-3587, Núm. 59/2018, Bilbao, págs. 75-97 
 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ced-59-2018pp75-97 • http://ced.revistas.deusto.es 79
Independence Party (UKIP) and the German Alternative für Deutschland 
(AfD)7. Although there is hardly a consensus about the common ideological 
and programmatic characteristics of these parties, the following are usually 
referred to as features that all Far Right parties share: a form of extreme, 
antidemocratic ultra-nationalism which extols the value of the national 
community based on the ethnically homogeneous in-group; stemming from 
this, a strong anti-immigration, xenophobic stance (what Mudde calls nativ-
ism8) and a profound critique of the European Union, which can adopt the 
form of either soft or hard Euroscepticism; this goes hand in hand with a 
populist style and rhetoric which emphasize the virtues of the common peo-
ple vis-à-vis the corrupt elite and claims to represent only the formers’ in-
terests9. Last but not least, most scholars have emphasized the Far Right’s 
authoritarianism and their position at the far end of the political spectrum, 
in the “rightest-right” spatial location10.
7 This short list is obviously not an exhaustive account of all Far Right / extremist / 
radical right-wing parties in Western Europe. Furthermore, it may as well include some 
disputed cases, such as the Norwegian Progress Party (which some scholars consider a 
neo-liberal right-wing party) and the UKIP (see, for different opinions, Cas Mudde, Pop-
ulist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Elisabeth Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe (Manchester: Manchester Uni-
versity Press, 2005); Pippa Norris, Radical Right. Voters and Parties in the Electoral 
Market, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Herbert Kitschelt (in collabo-
ration with Anthony J. McGann), The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative 
Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah L. 
de Lange and Matthijs Rooduijn,. Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Eu-
rope: Into the Mainstream? (New York: Routledge, 2016)). This selection of cases sim-
ply aims at highlighting the good overall performance of some of the (usual) members of 
this family.
8 Cas Mudde, “The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy”. West European 
Politics 33-6 (2010).
9 On the ideology of the Far Right, see specially Mudde, “The War of Words Defin-
ing the Extreme Right Party Family”, 1996; Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Eu-
rope, 2007; Kitschelt (in collaboration with McGann), The Radical Right in Western Eu-
rope: A Comparative Analysis, 1995; Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe, 2005; 
Jens Rydgren, The Populist Challenge: Political Protest and Ethno-Nationalist Mobiliza-
tion in France (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004); Jens Rydgren, Class politics and the radi-
cal right (New York: Routledge, 2012); Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in 
Western Europe (London: Macmillan, 1994); Roger Eatwell, “The Rebirth of the ‘Extreme 
Right’ in Western Europe?”. Parliamentary Affairs 53 (2000); Roger Eatwell, “Introduc-
tion. The New Extreme Right Challenge”. In Western Democracies and the New Extreme 
Right Challenge, edited by Roger Eatwell and Cas Mudde (London-New York: Routledge, 
2004).
10 Ignazi, “The Silent Counter Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of the Extreme 
Right-Wing Parties in Europe”, 1992.
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Table 1
Highest vote percentage of some Far Right parties (1990-2017)
 Type of elections % vote seats % seats
FPÖ (Austria) European 1996 27.50  6* 28.60%
VB (Belgium) European 2004 14.34  3* 12.50%
SVP/UDC (Switzerland) Parliamentary 2015 29.40 65* 32.50%
DF (Denmark) European 2014 26.60  4* 30.80%
PS (Finland) Parliamentary 2011 19.05 39* 19.50%
FN (France) European 2014 24.90 24* 32.40%
UKIP (United Kingdom) European 2014 26.60 24* 32.88%
LN (Italy) European 2009 10.21  9* 12.50%
PVV (the Netherlands) European 2009 17.00  4* 16.00%
FRP (Noruega) Parliamentary 2009 22.90 41* 24.30%
SD (Suecia) Parliamentary 2014 12.86 49* 14.04%
AfD Parliamentary 2017 12.60 92* 13.26%
(*) AfD received 94 seats in September 2017 but lost two of them when the former presi-
dent of the party, Frauke Petry, alongside another member of the newly elected group, left the 
party the day after the elections.
Sources: European Election Database; Political Data Yearbook ; PARLINE database on na-
tional parliaments; www.parties-and-elections.eu; www.parlgov.org
The data above show that, with the exception of the Finns Party and the 
Dutch PVV, Far Right parties have achieved their highest scores in elec-
tions to the European Parliament. The European level of contest has, para-
doxically, constituted the best scenario for political formations with a strong 
anti-European stance, with results in the domestic arena not always being so 
impressive11. Indeed, the data for elections to the national Parliaments (see 
11 See, however, Mudde, The Study of Populist Radical Right Parties: Towards a Fourth 
Wave, 2016; Alexandre Afonso, “The far right vote in the European elections: It’s not the 
economy, stupid” (2014); and Daphne Halikiopoulou and Sofia Vasilopoulou, “Support for 
the Far Right in the 2014 European Parliament Elections: A Comparative Perspective”. Po-
litical Quarterly 85-3 (2014) for a discussion on the relative success of the Far Right in the 
2014 elections, which were expected to be an earthquake election.
See also Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas “The Rise of the Far Right in Debtor 
and Creditor European Countries: The Case of European Parliament Elections”. Political 
Quarterly 86-2 (2015); Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas, “Risks, Costs and Labour 
Markets: Explaining Cross-national Patterns of Far Right Party Success in European Parlia-
ment Elections”. Journal of Common Market Studies JCMS 54-3 (2016) on the Far Right and 
European elections, and Catherine Fieschi, “European institutions: the far-right and illiberal 
politics in a liberal context”. Parliamentary Affairs 53-3 (2000); and Margarita Gómez-Reino 
and Iván Llamazares, “The Populist Radical Right and European Integration: A Comparative 
Analysis of Party–Voter Links”. West European Politics 36-4 (2013) on the anti-European-
ism of the Far Right.
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Graphs 2 and 3 below) reveal that the upsurge of the extreme right cannot be 
simply depicted as a steady process from complete irrelevance and/or mar-
ginalisation to resounding, unstoppable success. Quite the opposite is true: 
to start with, individual trajectories of most Far Right parties have suffered 
from typical ups and downs; secondly, there are big differences in their level 
of performance in national elections. For the sake of clarity, I have divided 
the group of successful Far Right parties (those which have achieved par-
liamentary representation) into two sub-groups: one with the “oldest new” 
Far Right parties (Graph 1) and one with the “newest new” ones (Graph 2). 
The “oldest new” parties were created in the seventies and eighties (or even 
earlier) and started being successful in the nineties. This group includes the 
French Front National (1972); the Austrian Freedom Party (1956); the Dan-
ish People’s Party (created in 1995 but heir to the Danish Progress Party, 
which was formed in 1972); the Norwegian Progress Party (1973); the Swiss 
Popular Party (1971); the Italian Lega Nord (1991) and the Vlaams Belang 
(successor to the Vlaams Blok, formed in 1978 and disbanded in 2004). By 
contrast, the “newest-new” Far Right parties were either born very recently, 
like the Dutch Party of Freedom (2006) or the German AfD (2013) and/
or have enjoyed a meteoric rise since the beginning of this century, like the 
Finns Party (whose rise did not take place until 2011), the Sweden Demo-
crats (from 2010 onwards), the Greek Golden Dawn (with seats in the Na-
tional Parliament first achieved in 2012), and the famous British UKIP 
(which, although formed in 1993, began its take-off in 2010) 12.
12 In several countries, some other (usually minor) Far Right parties have coexisted 
alongside the above mentioned. This has been the case at least: in Austria, where Haider left 
the FPÖ and founded the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ-Bundnis Zukunft Österre-
ichs), which eventually adopted a liberal profile and became a minor party in the system; in 
France, where the former right-hand of Jean-Marie Le Pen, Megret, defected from the Front 
National and founded a short-lived initiative called the Mouvement National Républicain; in 
Italy, where the Lega Nord had coexisted with the old Movimento Sociale Italiano, and later 
with its transformation into Alleanza Nazionale; in Sweden, where a singular protest and 
flash-party, New Democracy, paved the way for the Sweden Democrats; in Denmark, home 
to one of the earliest anti-tax, ultra-liberal parties, the Progress Party, founded in 1973 and 
which later split and gave birth to the successful Dansk Folkeparti; in the Netherlands, which 
saw the phenomenon of the ephemeral List Pim Fortuyn, named after its assassinated leader, 
shortly before Wilders founded his PVV; in Greece, a country where there have been plenty 
of Far Right organizations like EPEN and LAOS which have eventually converged towards 
Golden Dawn and its leader Michaloliakos; and in Switzerland, which has also attested to the 
launching of several anti-immigration campaigns and platforms, and where a small protest, 
xenophobic and anti-ecological movement called the Auto Partei was able to break through 
the system in the nineties. Overall, however, competition in the Far Right has diminished and 
only some of the formations have managed to survive. Again, the selection of cases turns out 
to be of key importance here: had other successful —but now defunct— Far Right parties 
been included in this description, this process of concentration which has taken place in the 
last decades in the extremist camp would have become visible.
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Graph 1
The “oldest-new” Far Right parties’ electoral trajectories  
(elections to the National Parliament)
Sources: European Election Database (www.nsd.uib.no); Political Data Yearbook  
(www.politicaldatayearbook.com); PARLINE database on national parliaments  
(www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp); www.parties-and-elections.eu
Graph 2
The “newest-new” Far Right parties’ electoral trajectories  
(elections to the National Parliament)
Sources: European Election Database (www.nsd.uib.no); Political Data Yearbook  
(www.politicaldatayearbook.com); PARLINE database on national parliaments  
(www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp); www.parties-and-elections.eu
Electoral data show that the performance of the various Far Right par-
ties varies greatly, both in terms of length (the differences being most vis-
ible, for obvious reasons, between the longest- and shortest-lived parties) 
and degree of success. It is therefore hardly surprising that a growing num-
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ber of comparative contributions on the Far Right have long aimed at ex-
plaining this varying degree of success of the Far Right13. Indeed, this so-
called third wave of right-wing extremism has had a distinctive resonance 
in each Western European country, although some commonalities may also 
be discernible. Among the parties cited, nearly half of them achieve an av-
erage percentage of votes under 10% in the period under research, 1990 to 
the present. Although usually amplified by the media, the average electoral 
results in national elections of parties like the Vlaams Belang, Chrisy Agvi, 
Lega Nord and Perussuomalaiset do not exceed 10% of the total number 
of votes. There is another group of parties with a better performance: the 
mean percentage achieved by the FN, PVV, DF, FPÖ and FRP lies some-
where between 10 and 17.5% (still well under a fifth of the total votes cast 
by the electorates). And finally, there is a clear outlier: the most successful 
party of all, the Swiss SVP, which since its transformation in the nineties 
under the leadership of Christoph Blocher, has managed to receive the sup-
port of practically a quarter of Swiss voters. As a whole, therefore, the fam-
ily of Far Right parties has done only moderately well at the polls since the 
beginning of the third wave of right-wing extremism. Furthermore, despite 
some resounding electoral results, the Far Right family’s overall electoral 
evolution should be best described—both individually and as a group—as 
following uneven (if not utterly erratic) patterns, as the figures above show. 
However, the fact that some of the members of this family (especially the 
“oldest new”) have accumulated a rather long trajectory of decades attests 
to their long-term electoral consolidation and lends support to the idea that 
they are here to stay, since they have been able to accomplish both elec-
toral breakthrough and survival. In this sense, they are behaving quite like 
the other, mainstream parties, which also experience advances and setbacks 
13 Several scholars have emphasized the diverse performance of Far Right parties and 
recommend the analysis of their trajectories from a truly comparative perspective, adopting 
a “cross-national, cross-temporal, and cross-party” approach (Sarah L. De Lange, “From Pa-
riah to Power: Explanations for the Government Participation of Radical Right-wing Popu-
list Parties in West European Parliamentary Democracies”. Doctoral Dissertation. Univer-
sity of Antwerp (2008):17; see Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europ, 2005; Norris, 
Radical Right. Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, 2005; Michael Minkenberg, “The 
Radical Right in Europe: Challenges for Comparative Research”. In Strategies for Combat-
ing Right-Wing Extremism in Europe, Bielefeld: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung (2010); Kai 
Arzheimer and Elisabeth Carter, “Political Opportunity Structures and Right-Wing Extrem-
ist Party Success”. European Journal of Political Research 45 (2006); David Art, “Why 2013 
Is Not 1933: The Radical Right in Europe”. Current History 112-752 (2013):88; Terri E. 
Givens, Voting Radical Right in Western Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005); Matt Golder, “Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in West-
ern Europe”. Comparative Political Studies 36-4 (2003); Matt Golder, “Far Right Parties in 
E urope”. Annual Review of Political Science 19-1 (2016).
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at the polls. And, in so doing, they are mainstreaming14 as well: “Extreme 
right ideas, movements and parties are a significant feature of post-war and 
millennium politics. In national electoral terms, they have made an uneven 
but appreciable impact, stretching from the margins to the mainstream of 
power”15. This impression is further confirmed by the analysis of a related, 
complementary aspect in the Far Right’s political development, to which I 
now turn.
III.  Political evolution: from the margins to the mainstream?
In order to fully assess the relevance and strength of the new Far Right 
parties and their ability to resemble other established, mainstream parties16, 
not only their electoral results but also additional information on their coa-
litionability should be taken into account (see Table 4 below). Apart from 
gaining a considerable number of votes and seats for an extended period 
of time, some extremist parties have reached power positions, either en-
tering coalition governments or supporting other parties in their effort to 
build one. In doing so, they have abandoned their status as pariah17, thus 
becoming salonfähig, “respectable” coalition partners18. The ability to es-
14 The concept of “mainstreaming” is rather new. Scarce research has been devoted to 
this process of convergence between mainstream and radical parties, which involves both 
changes of mainstream parties toward radical parties and changes of radical parties towards 
mainstream parties (Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn, Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties 
in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream?, 2016: 6). Here, I will only refer to the latter.
15 Hainsworth, Paul (ed.), The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the 
Mainstream, 2000:14.
16 The term “mainstream” is an umbrella term, referring, on the one hand, to centre left 
and centre right and/or conventional parties and, on the other hand, to established parties 
which are loyal to the political system (Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn, Radical Right-
Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream?, 2016). Here I will use both 
“mainstream” and “established” as synonyms.
17 Sarah L. De Lange, “From Pariah to Power: Explanations for the Government Par-
ticipation of Radical Right-wing Populist Parties in West European Parliamentary Democra-
cies”. Doctoral Dissertation. University of Antwerp, 2008.
18 The study of cabinet coalitions among mainstream and extremists (or, for that mat-
ter, niche) parties is connected with a fairly new body of research devoted to the analy-
sis of the reactions of (both right- and left-wing) mainstream parties to the Far Right. See 
Tim Bale, “Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Eu-
rope’s Bipolarising Party Systems”. West European Politics 26-3 (2003): 67-90; Tim Bale, 
Christoffer Green-Pedersen, André Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther and Nick Sitter, “If You 
Can’t Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge 
from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe”. Political Studies 58-3 (2010); Bonnie 
M. Meguid, Party Competition Between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in 
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tablish coalitions and/or forge alliances with other parties could be consid-
ered a function of their endurance/electoral persistence: longer-lived Far 
Right parties ought to be preferred as coalition partners over younger ones 
(ceteris paribus). For instance, the long presence of the FPÖ in the Aus-
trian political system may have contributed to its consideration as a possi-
ble coalition partner. The same would apply to the Swiss SVP or, for that 
matter, the Norwegian Progress Party. However, this does not hold true for 
other cases: the French Front National, created in 1972, has always been 
excluded from any coalition at the national level of government, whereas 
the Vlaams Belang (and its predecessor the Vlaams Blok) have been sys-
tematically isolated and marginalised in the Belgian political system, sub-
ject to the so called cordon sanitaire imposed by all other parties. Further-
more, some very new Far Right parties were called into government, like 
The Finns after the Parliamentary elections in 2011, even though these were 
really their breakthrough elections. Eventually, they joined the cabinet in 
201519. This means that some Far Right parties may be able to skip some 
phases of the traditional lifespan followed by most political parties, moving 
on from (practically) mere breakthrough to outright acceptation as a legiti-
mate partner by the other parties20.
Western Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Joost Van Spanje, “Con-
tagious parties. Anti-immigration parties and their impact on other parties’ immigration 
stances in contemporary Western Europe”. Party Politics 16-5 (2010); David Art, “React-
ing to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria”. Party Politics 13-3 (2007); 
William M. Downs, “Pariahs in their Midst: Belgian and Norwegian Parties React to Ex-
tremist Threats”. West European Politics 24-3 (2001); Sjoerdje Van Heerden , Sarah L de 
Lange, Wouter Van Der Brug and Meindert Fennema, “The Immigration and Integration 
Debate in the Netherlands: Discursive and Programmatic Reactions to the Rise of Anti-Im-
migration Parties”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40-1 (2014); Gijs Schumacher 
and Kees van Kersbergen, “Do Mainstream Parties Adapt To the Welfare Chauvinism of 
Populist Parties?”. Party Politics 22-3 (2016). Furthermore, the arrival of Far Right parties 
into office has prompted an even broader area of research focused on the impact of these 
new competitors in different realms.
19 The Finns were granted four portfolios in the new cabinet, which included the con-
troversial appointment of their leader Timo Soini as Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
After a change in leadership in June 2017, all ministers and 19 (out of 38) MPs left the party 
and founded a new one called Blue Reform (initially New Alternative). The cabinet contin-
ued with the same ministers (plus one more granted to the three partners in the coalition), but 
former members of The Finns now rally under the new party, whereas The Finns have gone 
into opposition. 
20 The case of the List Pim Fortuyn was even more extreme in this respect: it was invited 
to join the Dutch government right after its first candidacy to the Parliament. It was precisely 
the demands posed by this new situation that boosted internal breakdown, already acute after 
its leader was assassinated on the eve of the 2002 general elections.
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Table 2
Far Right parties in government
Political Party Country Period
Status
in government support party
FPÖ Austria
1999-2002 x  
2003-2005 x
2017- x  
SVP/UDC Switzerland 1959-2003 x  2003 (*)- x  
DF Denmark
2001-2005 x
2005-2007 x
2007-2011 x
2015- x
PS (The Finns) Finland 2015- x  
LN Italy
1994-1995 x  
2001-2006 x  
2008-2011 x  
FRP Norway 2013- x  
PVV Netherlands 2010-2012  x
(*) Starting in 2003, the spectacular electoral rise of the SVP enabled a change in the compo-
sition of the Swiss cabinet. The SVP now appointed two Federal Counsellors instead of one.
Source: own elaboration; de Lange (2012).
As the above table shows, the government participation of Far Right 
parties is neither a novel phenomenon, nor a recent one. Quite the contrary: 
it is rather ordinary, the total exclusion of the French FN and the VB be-
ing rather the exception—among the “oldest-new” group of parties—rather 
than the rule. The inability of some members of the family to be regarded 
as potential coalition partners has been tackled already: “Radical right-wing 
populist parties that are systematically excluded from government coali-
tions lack legislative strength, either as a consequence of their limited elec-
toral support or of the distortions created by the electoral system. They also 
have policy positions that are markedly different from those of mainstream 
parties, which makes it virtually impossible for these two types of parties to 
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reach policy compromises”21. This means the participation in government 
of these parties is to be understood as a mere consequence of their political 
growth and impact on the respective party systems; furthermore, it means it 
can be explained with the same variables which account for other parties’ 
analogous situation22. Hence, it can also be interpreted as another sign of 
the mainstreaming process these parties are undertaking.
This impression is further reinforced by the analysis of the reasons 
which have led some other mainstream parties to coalesce with the Far 
Right, and more importantly, by the analysis of their consequences23. Sev-
eral studies have emphasized the idea that the extremists’ inclusion into 
governmental responsibilities could have the effect of watering down their 
21 De Lange, “From Pariah to Power: Explanations for the Government Participation of 
Radical Right-wing Populist Parties in West European Parliamentary Democracies”, 2008: 
221.
22 In later contributions, Sarah L. De Lange, “New Alliances: Why Mainstream Parties 
Govern with Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties”, Political Studies 60-4 (2012) has speci-
fied that the establishment of new alliances among the far and the mainstream right has been 
helped by their programmatic convergence and by the general shift to the right.
23 There is extensive literature on the reactions of mainstream (both right- and left-
wing) parties to the Far Right. For interesting conclusions, see Bale, Green-Pedersen, 
Krouwel, Richard Luther and Sitter, “If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining So-
cial Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western 
Europe”, 2010; Meguid, Party Competition Between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral 
Fortunes in Western Europe (2008); Bale, “Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Main-
stream and Extreme Right in Europe’s Bipolarising Party Systems”, 2003; Van Spanje, 
“Contagious parties. Anti-immigration parties and their impact on other parties’ immigra-
tion stances in contemporary Western Europe”, 2010; Art, “Reacting to the Radical Right: 
Lessons from Germany and Austria”, 2007; William M. Downs, “Pariahs in their Midst: 
Belgian and Norwegian Parties React to Extremist Threats”. West European Politics 24-3 
(2001); Ted Perlmutter, “The Politics of Restriction: The Effect of Xenophobic Parties on 
Italian Immigration Policy and German Asylum Policy”, in Shadows over Europe: The De-
velopment and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, edited by Martin Schain, 
Aristide Zolberg and Patrick Hossay (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Roger 
Karapin, “Far-Right Parties and the Construction of Immigration Issues in Germany”, in 
Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Europe, ed-
ited by Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg and Patrick Hossay (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2002); Dietrich Thränhardt, “The Political Uses of Xenophobia in England, France 
and Germany”. Party Politics, 1-3 (1995); Van Heerden, de Lange, Van Der Brug and 
Fennema, “The Immigration and Integration Debate in the Netherlands: Discursive and 
Programmatic Reactions to the Rise of Anti-Immigration Parties”, 2014; Gijs Schumacher 
and Kees van Kersbergen, “Do Mainstream Parties Adapt To the Welfare Chauvinism of 
Populist Parties?”. Party Politics 22-3 (2016); Ted Perlmutter, “The Politics of Restriction: 
The Effect of Xenophobic Parties on Italian Immigration Policy and German Asylum Pol-
icy”, in Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in West-
ern Europe, edited by Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg and Patrick Hossay (New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2002).
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most extreme political stances24. Once in government, Far Right parties 
would suffer from the “taming effect”25. In a similar vein, van Spanje and 
van der Brug conclude that when parties are not ostracised they become 
more moderate, whereas those treated as outcasts continue to be extrem-
ist26. This is what has been called “the inclusion-moderation thesis, which 
holds that participation in democratic institutions and procedures will 
amend the radical nature and ideology of political parties”27. Several studies 
have concluded that, for instance, the entrance of the FPÖ into the Austrian 
government was regarded by its partner, the conservative ÖVP, as the only 
way of deterring its continuous growth, on the belief that the responsibil-
ity of holding office would create internal problems in the party and prompt 
its moderation28. What have been the effects of the Far Right’s inclusion 
into office? Can we ascertain whether any softening of their positions has 
taken place, and, if so, if this has been provoked by their new status? Again, 
research on this area is scarce and provides inconclusive evidence: some 
scholars claim holding office may be compatible with upholding a radical 
profile29. Moreover, are there any signs that the Far Right —whether in of-
fice or not— has toned down its programmatic stance in the last years as a 
result of its sustained electoral growth? The following section approaches 
the issue of the programmatic mainstreaming of the Far Right.
24 See, for instance, Joost Van Spanje and Wouter Van Der Brug. “The Party as Pariah: 
The Exclusion of Anti-Immigration Parties and its Effect on their Ideological Positions”. 
West European Politics 30-5 (2007); Fraser Duncan, “Immigration and integration policy and 
the Austrian radical right in office: the FPÖ/BZÖ, 2000-2006”. Contemporary Politics 16-4 
(2010); Franz Fallend and Reinhard Heinisch, “Collaboration as Successful Strategy Against 
Right-wing Populism? The Case of the Centre-right Coalition in Austria, 2000-2007”. De-
mocratization 23-2 (2016).
25 Michael Minkenberg, “The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-Setting and Policy 
Effects”. West European Politics 24-4 (2001).
26 Van Spanje and Van Der Brug. “The Party as Pariah: The Exclusion of Anti-Immigra-
tion Parties and its Effect on their Ideological Positions”, 2007.
27 Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah L. de Lange and Matthijs Rooduijn, Radical Right-Wing 
Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream? (New York: Routledge, 2016): 3
28 De Lange, “From Pariah to Power: Explanations for the Government Participation of 
Radical Right-wing Populist Parties in West European Parliamentary Democracies”, 2008; 
De Lange, “New Alliances: Why Mainstream Parties Govern with Radical Right-Wing Popu-
list Parties”, 2012.
29 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, “The Lega Nord Back in Government”. 
West European Politics 33-6 (2010)
The inclusion-moderation thesis is mirrored by the exclusion-radicalisation thesis: parties 
systematically isolated and excluded from the political system (and from government) will 
tend to radicalise (Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn, Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties 
in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream? (2016)). There is, however, no consensus on this 
(see William M. Downs, “Pariahs in their Midst: Belgian and Norwegian Parties React to Ex-
tremist Threats”, West European Politics 24-3 (2001)). 
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IV.  Radicalisation: the discourse on refugees and others. From the 
mainstream and back.
As Akkerman, de Lange and Roodjuin have argued30, there may be dif-
ferent dimensions of non-mainstreamness, which can be measured by as-
sessing the parties’ positions (over time) on the core issues of immigration 
(and the integration of immigrants), and European integration and authori-
tarianism, in line with the definition above. Their analysis has concluded 
that there is no trend towards the mainstream when it comes to radical po-
sitions on these topics between 1995 and 2012, therefore lending little sup-
port to the inclusion-moderation thesis31.
This may not seem astonishing if we recall how, in the last couple of 
years, public debate in the European Union has been dominated by the om-
nibus issue of immigration, prompted by the so-called refugee crisis. Start-
ing in 2015, the arrival of increasing numbers of migrants has forced the 
EU to provide the member states with a solution to relocate asylum seek-
ers and resettle refugees32. As a consequence, Far Righ parties have taken 
on the issue and pushed for tougher measures against the arrival of more 
migrants. The Front National specifically addresses the topic as the first 
key word on its web page, clearly linking it to the rise in delinquency fig-
ures: “Chiffres de la délinquance: la surreprésentation des étrangers doit 
alerter les pouvoirs publics!”; and presents itself as the only solution contre 
l’immigration (FN 2018); in Italy, the Northern League has recently caused 
major uproar with declarations on immigration and the problem of “race”. 
The new leader Salvini seems determined to exploit the issue for the up-
coming general elections in March 2018. The party officially claims that 
“numbers” demonstrate an invasion is taking place which must be stopped 
and endorses the traditional Far Right slogan Italians first. As for the ostra-
cised Flemish Vlaams Belang and its counterpart in Holland, Wilders’ Party 
30 Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn, Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western 
Europe: Into the Mainstream? (2016).
31 According to Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn, Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties 
in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream? (2016), there are at least two other dimensions of 
mainstreaming which may be measured together with the moderation of core programmatic 
positions of radical parties: the expansion of their issue agenda and a stronger emphasis on 
socioeconomic issues (typical of niche parties) and the moderation of their populist positions 
(characteristic of anti-establishment parties). 
32 The issue has proven highly divisive: some European countries have reintroduced bor-
der controls and refused to accept their quota of refugees, whereas Germany’s plans of ac-
cepting more migrants have been curtailed, facing severe international and internal opposi-
tion.
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for Freedom, they have strengthened their anti-immigrant stance in the last 
years (and months), and emphasized their anti-Islamic discourse33.
A rather similar impression stems from the analysis of the more coa-
litionable Far Right parties. The allegedly moderate Norwegian Progress 
Party claims the “asylum system needs reform to ensure that those who get 
their application accepted have a real safety need, and have not skirted the 
system. Immigrants who come to Norway and break the law should face 
expulsion”, and it is proud to declare that “After passing necessary legis-
lation and revision of our laws, we can now see that immigration numbers 
are falling, while our neighbouring countries experience increased asy-
lum numbers every year. By strengthening the police’s capabilities, illegal 
immigrants who break Norwegian laws are now facing expulsion” (FRP 
2018). As for the Dansk Folkeparty, the official party program (established 
in 2002) reads as follows: “Denmark is not an immigrant-country and never 
has been. Thus we will not accept transformation to a multiethnic soci-
ety. Denmark belongs to the Danes and its citizens must be able to live in 
a secure community founded on the rule of law, which develops along the 
lines of Danish culture” (DF 2018). For its part, the FPÖ, now in the Aus-
trian government, defines itself as a patriotic party and stresses “The lan-
guage, history and culture of Austria are German. The vast majority of Aus-
trians are part of the German peoples’, linguistic and cultural community 
(...) Austria is not a country of immigration. This is why we pursue a family 
policy centred around births” (FPÖ 2011).
Additional analyses based on individual case studies also suggest some 
mixed evidence in favour of the inclusion-moderation thesis and the more 
general process of convergence between Far Right and established par-
ties: “On all three dimensions—radical positions on core issues, salience 
of cultural issues and anti-establishment positions—the average trends do 
not indicate that radical right-wing populist parties have mainstreamed”34. 
If the analysis of official party programmes does not lend support to the ar-
gument in favour of a programmatic moderation/convergence of Far Right 
and mainstream parties, data based on experts surveys confirm they are per-
ceived to take extremist positions on the issue of immigration (more than 9 
on a ten-point scale), also showing extreme values on a scale which meas-
ures the relevance of the immigration issue for this family of parties: ex-
perts have assigned a value of 9.0 to the FPÖ on this scale (relevance of im-
migration), 9.9 to the VB, 9.9 to the Dansk Folkeparty, 9.1 to the Finns, 9.6 
33 Wilders actually urges the Netherlands to de-Islamize: see the party’s oficial webpage 
https://www.pvv.nl/images/Conceptverkiezingsprogrammma.pdf
34 Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn, Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western 
Europe: Into the Mainstream? (2016).
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to the FN and the Lega Nord and even 9.3 (out of ten) to the governmen-
tal FRP in Norway and to the Swiss SVP35. It seems electoral consolidation 
and the evolution from marginalisation to political and governmental in-
volvement has not yet led to a programmatic convergence (or mainstream-
ing) of the Far Right.
V. Conclusion
The phenomenon of the Far Right has already undergone several phases 
of growth, and there is ample evidence to believe that, all in all, extrem-
ist parties are now a force to be reckoned with in European politics36. Their 
new status as established, consolidated forces remains undisputed due to 
both their sustained electoral development and their new status as govern-
ment supporters or even cabinet member parties. Allegedly, this should 
have come hand in hand with a process of moderation and/or mainstream-
ing. At least from an ideological perspective, this process seems not to have 
taken place yet, although more research is to be undertaken in alternative, 
complementary realms of mainstreaming. More in-depth study is also ad-
visable in order to fully ascertain the extent of their impact on other parties 
(not only on immigration policy)37. This is by no means a way of over-em-
35 Joost Van Spanje, “Contagious parties. Anti-immigration parties and their impact on 
other parties’ immigration stances in contemporary Western Europe”. Party Politics 16-5 
(2010).
36 Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn, Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western 
Europe: Into the Mainstream? (2016).
37 See Matthew Goodwin, Vidhya Ramalingam and Rachel Briggs, The New Radical 
Right: violent and non-violent movements in Europe (London: Institute for Strategic Dia-
logue, 2012) for alternative, complementary measures of impact. On the topic of the Far 
Right’s impact, see especially Martin A. Schain, “The Impact of the French National Front on 
the French Political System”, in Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg and Patrick Hossay, Shad-
ows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Martin A. Schain, “The Extreme-Right and Immi-
gration Policy-Making: Measuring Direct and Indirect Effects”. West European Politics 29-2 
(2006); Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg and Patrick Hossay, Shadows over Europe: The De-
velopment and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2002); Ted Perlmutter, “The Politics of Restriction: The Effect of Xenophobic Par-
ties on Italian Immigration Policy and German Asylum Policy”, in Shadows over Europe: 
The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, edited by Martin 
Schain, Aristide Zolberg and Patrick Hossay (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Kyung 
Joon Han, “The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties on the Positions of Mainstream Par-
ties Regarding Multiculturalism”. West European Politics 38-3 (2015); Michael Minkenberg, 
“Context and Consequence. The Impact of the New Radical Right on the Political Process in 
France and Germany”. German Politics and Society 16-3 (1998); Michael. Minkenberg, “The 
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phasizing their relevance. As a matter of fact, there is an increasing number 
of contributions claiming that these parties receive more academic attention 
than they deserve38. Rather, what is meant here is that we should definitely 
start considering them as a pathological normalcy39 instead of a normal pa-
thology40. This implies not only a different analytical approach to the topic 
(Far Right parties are best understood and studied with the same analyti-
cal and research tools as any other family of parties), but also a considera-
tion that they represent a radicalisation of mainstream values widely spread 
among Western electorates. Their mainstreaming process may ultimately 
not be necessary if the mainstream continues to radicalise.
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